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EXPLOSION ON 5th MAY, 1930, AT THE OIL-CAKE 
WORKS OF ME RS. J. BIBBY & SONS, LTD., 
LIVERPOOL. 
To H.M. Chief Inspector of Factories, 
Sir, 
\Ve beg to report that, in accordance with instructions, we 
have investigated the explosion which occurred on Monday, 5th May, 
1930, at the works of Messrs. J Bibby & Sons, Ltd., Liverpool. 
We visited the works on the day following the explosion, and 
further visits were paid by us during the following eight days. 
The explosion took place on thc top floor of the silo building. 
Eleven men died from their injuries: 32 others suffered injury by 
burning. 
This accident happened in a plant used only for storage, and 
though there was, no doubt, a dust explosion, the conditions were 
entirely different from those obtaining in any previous explosion 
known to us which has occurred in this country. An explosion 
which occurred in 1911 in a separate part of this factory took 
place in a grinding plant, under conditions cntirely dissimilar to 
the present case (Sf< Cd. 6223, 1912). 
The silo building consists of eleven storeys and contains 22 steel 
silos, one sub-divided into 32 smaller .. pocket" silos, each 95 ft. 
deep and varying in section, some measuring 22 ft. by 11 ft. and 
others 11 ft. by 9 ft. in cross section. The large silos have a capacity 
of 300 tons. Each �ilo forms a unit in what is practically a long 
rectangular steel box (95 ft. deep) sub-divided by vertical partition 
steel plates so that there is only the thickness of these plates between 
contiguous silos. They are supported on vertical steel columns 
which rise to the level of the seventh floor. 
Where four silos adjoin one another, the top of the central 
supporting column passes through the right-angled corner common 
to the four and is blanked off from each silo by a corner plate through 
which pass the horizontal floor girders. The tops of the silos are 
level,vith the gangways on the top floor and 12 ft. above this there 
is a concrete roof. 
The north and sou th ends of this top floor were closed by 
corrugated iron plates (blown out by the explosion) and on the east 
side \\all theJc are a number of elevat.Jrs which bring material 
from the ground level and discharge it on to cross conveyor bands 
running east to west. These in turn discharge to conveyor worms 
running along the tops of the silos, north and south. From the 
conveyor worms the material drops into the silos as required through 
long inclined chutes. These feed chutes are specially designed to 
prevent formation of�dust clouds in the silos when filling is in 
progress. 
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At the bottom of each silo there is a valve feeding a revolving 
table which, when in action, causes the ,tored material passing 
out of the silo to fall into a chute leading to conveyor worm below 
the floor. During the tilling of a silo there is a tendency for the 
material to pack unevenly and to prevent this / ...... shaped cross 
distributing beams are fixed in each silo. They are spaced 2 ft. 11 in. 
apart and one row is 3 ft. below the row above in a hit and miss 
arrangement. The silos were designed to carry only the relatively 
light materials stored in them. 
A plan of the arrangement of the four silos concerned in the 
explosion is shown in Fig. I. They were numhered '2,3, 11 and 13, 
and were filled as follows :-
No. 2.-Rangoon rice bran. 
3.-Parboiled rice bran. 
I I.-Sunflower <eed cake. 
13.-Soya bean meal. 
So far as can be ascertained, it has not been cu tomary in thi; 
country to use silos for storing such materials. We were informed 
that one of the reasons for doing so was becau e it wa, thought 
that there would be less danger of spontaneous combustion if the 
materials were stored in this way rather than in bags. 
Sunflower seed has been found to be particularly prone to 
.. lire" when stored in bags, owing to the amount of readily 
oxidisable oil contained in it. 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE EXPLOSION. 
On Friday night (2nd May, 1930), No. 11 silo showed signs 
of spontaneous combu tion, smoke in very slight quantities issuing 
from the corner A. Stpps were taken to empty the silo, and the 
firm's lire brigade played water on the top of the material in this 
silo until the emptying was completed on Saturday night. At no 
time, according to the e\�dence, was there more smoke at the top 
of the silo than might be caused by a man smoking his pipe. On 
Saturday night (3rd May), it was noticed that smoke was coming 
from No. 13, at corn.r B, and this silo was emptied by Sunday 
night. A little later, on aturday night, No. 2 began to smoke 
at corner C and they bpgan to empty it in a similar manner, the 
process being fini'hed on Sunday night (�th May). On Sunday night, 
No. 3 began to smoke in corner D and the) started to empty that 
also. On the Monday morning (5th May), at nine o'clock, No. 2 was 
empty and No. 3 smoking very little; the firm's fire brigade were 
concentrating their attention on it, ",hile at the same time the 
material was being removed in the usuallashion at the bottom valve. 
On the same morning, the engineers (Mr. Evans and Mr. Hiorns) 
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scorched and onc plate was slightly buckled by the heat. It was 
shortly after this. at a time when only -10 tons of material remained 
in No. 3 silo. that the explosion took place. 
The evidence of the firemen is to the effect that during the 
period from Friday night to �londay morning. although there 
was little emission of smoke from the top of th� ilos. there wa, 
Lam time to time evidence of fire at the top of the column at the 
centre of the four silos. Hoses were put up and. finally. wet bag, 
were pushed up the confined space so as to exclude air as far as 
possible. From the evidence, the fire appears to have been put out 
completely by daybreak on Monday. but there was a further outbreak 
at 930 that mOlnin!; It is evident that the fire at tlus point was 
due to air getting into the silo through the very small gaps between 
the floor girders and the corner plates referred to above 
McClure. the charge hand on No. 3 floor. states that on Monday 
morning he was running off the contents of No. 3 silo which appeared 
to be cool and perfectly normal. At 11.20 he heard a heavy fall of 
meal inside No. 3 and immediately afterwards a loud report. and a 
flash came down the elevator. According to this witness. there 
was a second report one or two nlinutes later. 
lIlr. James Bibby. Mr. Hiorns and the charge hand Perry were. 
at the time of the explosion. in No. 13 silo. They came out of the 
silo. and were passing along the top floor when they were caught by 
the second explo ion and blown in the direction from north to 
south. 
RESULT OF THE EXPLOSION. 
It is. we consider. evident that the explosive wave issuing from 
the silo was deflected by the concrete roof and then travelled in 
two directions (north and south) along the top floor and blew out 
the end corrugated panels. part of the wave passing down the 
elevator casings on the east wall and damaging them at their lowest 
points. No damage was done by the explosion to the silos themselves 
nor to the conveyor worm tubes directly above them. The overhead 
roof was slightly cracked in places. but the most serious damage 
was that which occurred at the bottom of the elevators. Some of 
the corrugated sheets wluch covered the north and south ends of 
the room were blown out. one of them being projected a distance 
of about 100 ft. 
CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION. 
The heatin!; of the sunflower seed cake and consequent trans­
ference of heat through the thin steel walls to the adjoining silos was. 
we consider. the original cause of the explosion. The fire which 
occurred from time to time in the centre space at the top of the 
column between the four silos was no doubt rendered possible by 
admission of air in small amount through slight gaps in the corner 
plates at the points where the floor girders pass through. 
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In our opinion the actual explosion may have been due to one 
of two causes. 
(I) It may be that when silo No. 3 was being slowly emptied, 
some of the material fomled a bridge on the cros spreader beams, 
and, later on, when the material below which was burning had 
dropped some considerable distance, the bridge of material collapsed 
and, in falling, produced a dust cloud which was ignited by the fire 
below. The dust of parboiled rice bran is explosive. • 
The evidence of the witness McClure (charge hand on No. 3 
floor) supports this theory. 
2. Another possible explanation is that when the material 
began to burn in a limited amount of air, some carbon monoxide 
was evolved; part of this would probably be burnt, but some may 
have escaped unburnt into the mass of material inside the silo. 
The faUing of the material in the silo may have eventually caused 
the gas to be diluted with air and, when this mixture was ignited, 
the re,lIltant small explosion raised a dust cloud which was in turn 
ignited with a more violent secondary explosion. 
We think that the amount of inflammable ga�, if formed as 
suggested above, could not have been very great, because before 
such a mixture could explode, it would have 10 contain (in the case 
of carbon monoxide) at least 12 per cent. of that gas. If such a 
mixture had been present in quantity in the silo there must, we 
consider, have been evidence ot .. gas�ing" among the men working 
on the top floor. Further, No. 3 silo had been entered several times 
on the Monday morning by the charge hand Perry without any 
evidence of poisonous gas being present. 
The second explo ion was possibly due to dust being blown 
up from some of the other silos by the first explosive wave. 
CORONER'S INQUIRY. 
The inquest was held on 14th May, 1930, at the Coroner's Court, 
Dale Street, Liverpool, by the Coroner, G. E. Mort, Esq., who 
conducted a most searching and painstaking inquiry into the whole 
of the circumstances attending the accident. The finding of the 
jury was .. that the deceased died from shock due to burns caused 
by explosions following spontaneous combustions of sunflower 
meal and rice meal in silos at Messrs. Bibby's Oil Cake Mills in 
Neptune Street on the 5th instant." 
The jury further recommended that .. before any alterations 
to the silos are proceeded with the plOposals should be submitted 
• Its explosive qualities have since been confirmed by the l\lines Depart­
ment Testing Station after examination of samples from the silo. The 
samples were submitted to the tests outlined in the Report on the 
Inflammability and Capacity for transmitting Explosions of Carbonaceous 
Dusts liable to be generated 00 Premises under the Factory and Workshop 
Acts, by R. V. Wheeler, D.Sc. (Cd. 6662, 1913) and placed in Class 1. 
to the Home Office for approval." .Mr. Dodds, on behalf of the 
finn, prorrtised that tliis recommendation would be acted upon 
and said;-
"�lessrs. Bibby are exceedingly grateful to His Majesty's 
Inspecto.rs for the care and attention which they have bestowed upon thIS very difficult subject, and for valuable suggestions they 
ha ve made. "1 hey wish me to assure you that all these suggestiolls 
WJIl be fully and carefully considered with a view to avoiding like 
accIdents in the future and minimising the risk to human life. They 
welcome tile co-operation of the Home Office, and they will be very 
glad to give all facilities for experiments and for further inquiry 
from every quarter." 
METHODS OF PREVENTION. 
Several methods for preventing such accidents have been 
suggested by us and the !inn have agreed to experiment in these 
directions. They are as follows ;-
(1) It seems desirable that in erecting such plant in future, 
the silos should be separated from each other either by adequate 
air spacing or by the use of heat-insulating material. Steps 
should also be taken to ensure that there are no gaps between 
plates, girders, etc., through which air can gain admission 
at the sides. 
(2) The concrete roof above the top floor DO doubt deflected 
the flames along the floors and gangways where the men were 
at work. We suggest that the 5ilos should be continued through 
this roof and that the to s should be covered b li ht covers 
which will lift m case 0 an explosion an , ow the ame to 
pass to open all" wtihout danger to men working on the floor 
below. 
--"(3) It may, we suggest, be possible to deal with any fire 
in a silo b installin tubes fitted with fusible lu s connected 
to a ca 1 e r at er mert as ressure su so that 
m case of any rise in temperature an escape of as sufficient 
o extmgUls e ec e w t e ace. It 
, le sam� lI"lle, necessary 0 provide an alarm to 
give warning when this device comes into action. Provision 
will have to be made to ensure that the bottom valves are gas­
tight and for testing carefully by automatic apparatus or 
other means, so as to prevent any risk of .. gassing" of persons 
below the silos or of persons entering the silos afterwards. 
(4) The provision of recording thermometers on the silos 
shonld, we think, be considered. 
In addition, Messrs. Bibby are, we understand, considering the 
desirability of shortening the silos, as it is thought that the depth 
may have tended to incr�ase the risk of spontaneous ignition. 
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It is obvious tbat the above suggestions will require very carelu\ 
experimt'nt and consideration before they are put into practice. 
We desire to express our appreciation to Messrs. Bibby & Sons, 
and their staff, for their courtesy in giving us every facility for 
obtaining evidence, 
29th May, 1930. 
We are, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servants, 
HENRY]. PEACOCK, 
H.M. Deputy Superintending 
Inspector of Factories, Liverpool. 
L. C. McNAIR, 
H.M. Engineering Inspector of 
Factories, Home Office. 
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